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TRADEMARKS, ANTITRUST AND THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION*
J. THOMAS McCARTHY**

I would like to make it clear that I speak for myself and myself only. While I am consultant to the Federal Trade Commission regarding its generic name cancellation program, I do not
speak for the Commission. The Federal Trade Commission is
able to more than adequately present its views in other forums.
The fact that I do not speak for the FTC will soon become quite
obvious, for I strongly disagree with the wisdom of some of the
positions the FTC has taken: for example, the position that the
brand loyalty of a trademark can be properly relied upon to find
illegal monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and
that compulsory trademark licensing is a proper remedy in antitrust cases. On the other hand, I agree with and endorse other
positions of the FTC: namely, its program to exercise its powers
granted by the Lanham Act to petition the Trademark Board to
cancel the federal registration of terms believed to be generic
names of products or services. Before outlining the reasons for
my disagreement and agreement with the FTC on these points, I
feel it necessary to discuss the unfortunate animosity and antipathy that some members of the trademark bar feel towards the
FTC as a federal agency.
The FTC, as a federal prosecuting, litigating and rule-making agency, has been given certain powers by Congress over the
years since 1914, and the United States Supreme Court has generally supported most cases of the FTC's exercise of those powers. Ten years ago, the American Bar Association
recommended to President Nixon that because the FTC had become so lethargic and moribund, it either activate itself or face
the prospect of total abolition by Congress.1 Faced by this blis* Copyright0 1979 J. Thomas McCarthy. All Rights Reserved. Based
on an address given at the John Marshall Law School 23rd Annual Conference of Intellectual Property Law, Chicago, February 22-23, 1979.
** Professor of Law, University of San Francisco; Author of the twovolume treatise on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (1973), Lawyers'
Co-operative Publishing Co., Rochester, N.Y.; J.D., 1963, University of Michigan; B.S., 1960, University of Detroit.
1. ABA COMMSSION TO STUDY THE FTC, REPORT OF THE ABA CoumMsSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
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tering criticism of its inactivity, the FTC as an agency has
roused itself into action and Congress has granted it additional
procedural powers in the past five years. In view of this history,
I have great difficulty understanding how some attorneys can
criticize the FTC in general for using its powers by an active program of antitrust enforcement and consumer protection. Certainly, to criticize individual positions taken by the FTC on
specific issues is not only appropriate, but is the responsibility
of the bar. But simply to damn the FTC to perdition, as I have
heard some attorneys do, is not responsible or constructive criticism.
Some seem to view the relationship between trademark
owners and attorneys on the one hand and the FTC on the other,
as a religious war where informed debate on differences in philosophy is irrelevant. Some think that the FTC can do nothing
right. Closed-minded sweeping condemnations of the FTC can
serve only to make the Trademark Bar look foolish and self-indulgent. Crying wolf whenever the FTC undertakes any action
which impacts in any way on trademarks will have the same result as it did when the little boy did see a wolf eating his sheep.
It is my fondest hope that the trademark bar will stop, look and
analyze FTC positions before jumping to conclusions. That is
exactly what we want the FTC to do before taking action which
will impact on trademarks: so let us provide a good example.
Having gotten that off my chest, let me set forth the reasons
why I disagree with some positions of the FTC and agree with
others. If I were addressing the policy makers of the FTC, I
would say, "I have bad news and good news." The bad news is
that you are very wrong and misinformed as to the competitive
impact of trademark ownership per se and as to compulsory
trademark licensing as an antitrust remedy. The good news is
that I think that a selective and careful exercise of your power to
petition to cancel registrations under the Lanham Act serves the
cause of fair competition and does no violence to trademarks.
For several years, FTC prosecutors have sought compulsory
trademark licensing as a remedy in the wake of finding an antitrust violation. This remedy has been sought in both the Breakfast Cereal case 2 and in the ReaLemon case. 3 The Breakfast
Cereal case is still at trial after almost three years. Administrative Law Judge Harry Hinkes has retired and the FTC has ordered a new judge appointed to the case. Thus, the future of the
2. In re Kellogg Co., No. 8883 (FTC filed April 26, 1972). See 11970-1973]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) $ 19,898; 13] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,495 (Dec. 8,
1978) (order re replacement of AW.).
3. In re Borden, Inc., No. 8978 (FTC filed July 2, 1974).
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Cereal case is in limbo at this time. In August, 1976, another
administrative law judge in the ReaLemon case found that Borden's ReaLemon subsidiary had unlawfully monopolized the
"processed lemon juice" market by means of geographically discriminatory pricing. The ALJ ordered Borden for ten years to
grant a license of the mark ReaLemon to any competitor at a
one-half of one percent royalty. On appeal, the full Commission
on November 7, 1978, affirmed the finding of monopolization but
4
rejected the remedy of compulsory licensing.
On the issue of monopolization, the Commission recognized
that ReaLemon started out with a "natural" monopoly simply
because it created the market by being the first to market a bottled lemon juice. But the Commission felt that ReaLemon had
taken steps designed to "ensure that that monopoly position
would not be lost or eroded." However, by virtue of being there
first, was not a continuing monopoly position of from 75 to 89%
inevitable because Borden was able to establish strong consumer preference for its trademark? In discussing this "inevitability" or "thrust upon" defense, Judge Learned Hand stated
almost 35 years ago that "[t]he successful competitor, having
been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he
wins. ' '5 The Commission found that ReaLemon's continuing
dominant market position was not achieved by"normal competitive means but by two "unfair" or "artificial" means: (1) price
discrimination; and (2) promotion of its trademark. While the
Commission could have decided the liability issue on price discrimination behavior alone, it appeared to go out of its way to
continually refer to the trademark as an artificial source of market power. The Commission stated that ReaLemon's marketplace advantage was not attributable to a superior product, but
rather that "ReaLemon is distinguished from its competitors
only by the strength of its trademark." In the context of the
whole opinion, it seems clear to me that the word "only"
designates the trademark as an artificial and unnatural source of
market position. This is clear to me because of statements such
as this: that ReaLemon's market position "was rooted largely in
its successful and spurious product differentiation that enabled
it to command a substantial price premium over essentially
identical offerings of other sellers. . . ." The Commission also
referred to the "imaginary superiority" which the trademark
gave to the product. That is, the Commission focused on the
physical aspects of the product as compared to its competitors,
4. In re Borden, Inc., [3] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCHI) 21,490 (FTC Nov. 7,
1978) (cease and desist order); P.T.CJ. (BNA) No. 406, D-1 (Nov. 30, 1978).
5. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430, 65 U.S.P.Q.
6, 19 (2d Cir. 1945).
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dismissing as "imaginary" product superiority as viewed by consumers. Commissioner Pitofsky agreed that "pronounced brand
loyalty is a barrier to entry."
This is not a new viewpoint: that trademarks are not a natural and essential element of the competitive process, but rather
are a necessary evil, to be dismissed as "irrational" or "imaginary." It has been forwarded by some economists for several
decades. In my opinion, it is very wrong and paternalistic to refuse to take consumer demand as a given and to second-guess it
by characterizing demand based on brand loyalty as "irrational"
or "imaginary." The Commission appears to be building upon
the theory that the only relevant and natural form of consumer
demand is that which is based upon the "intrinsic" value of
hardware: a painting. by Picasso is only $10.98 worth of oil and
canvas; a vial of perfume is only 98c worth of scented alcohol;
and a bottle of processed lemon juice is only a combination of
chemicals. But, as Alvin Toffler noted, each product goes to
market packed with a "psychic load" of intangible and non-utilitarian psychological factors and expectations. 6 A digital computer would not buy a Picasso painting or a vile of perfume and
would not have any brand loyalty because it is not a human being with a human desire for predictability of product and peace
of mind. To dismiss as "irrational" your human demand for
ReaLemon brand lemon juice because you feel more confident
in the kitchen with it than with another brand, is to say that
humans should act more like computers. It is to say that we
should reorganize our economic system through the antitrust
laws on the assumption that computers are, or should be, creating consumer demand. In sum, I find the Commission's analysis
of the contribution of brand loyalty to the finding of illegal monopolization both disturbing and disappointing.
A brighter spot in the Commission's majority holding is the
finding that, under the circumstances of the c.-se, compulsory
trademark licensing is too drastic a remedy. On the other hand,
the Commission quite clearly felt that it had the power later on
in this or future cases to turn to compulsory trademark licensing
as an acceptable remedy. On this I think the Commission is
quite wrong. I have set forth at great length in an article in the
Trademark Reporter 7 the reasons why I think compulsory trademark licensing may be merely a euphemism for what in practice
will be an improperly punitive confiscation of private property.
6. A.

TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 63 (1970).

7. McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark: Remedy or Penalty?, 67 T.M. Rep. 197 (1977). See also Palladino, Compulsory Licensing of
a Trademark, 68 T.M. Rep. 522 (1978).
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Trademarks are now a form of constitutionally protected free
speech, subject to the least restrictive alternative rule of remedies.8 I can envision no circumstances in which other remedies
will not be less restrictive than compulsory trademark licensing.
For the reasons set forth in my article, I have concluded that
compulsory trademark licensing is a sloppy and imprecise antitrust remedy since no one can predict with accuracy its competitive effect upon a market. It is unworkable, self-defeating, illegal
and probably unconstitutional.
But simply because the majority of the FTC in one case rejected it on the facts does not mean that the spectre of compulsory trademark licensing has passed from the scene. To the
contrary, it appears to be picking up more adherents. In the socalled "no fault" monopolization proposal submitted by the FTC
to the National Antitrust Commission, compulsory trademark licensing is proposed to be incorporated in a new antitrust statute.9
In the ReaLemon decision, Michael Pertschuk, Chairman of
the FTC, dissented, saying that the remedy prohibiting certain
pricing practices was not sufficient and that "some form of
trademark relief' should also be ordered. By this he meant either compulsory licensing or a prohibition on use of the trademark. Chairman Pertschuk's dissent is based upon his view
that "[t] he power inherent in the ReaLemon trademark and the
price premium it permitted, are the root of Borden's monopoly
power." From this he deduced that the trademark "serves not
merely as an identifier of the lemon juice sold under that name,
but provides respondent with a mechanism to control prices and
entry in the processed lemon juice market, and acts as a formidable barrier to entry." Chairman Pertschuck relied on and
quoted from a book review written in 1977 by Professor Scherer
8. In Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979), a majority of seven justices upheld as against a first amendment challenge a Texas statute prohibiting the use of trade names by professional optometrists. In passing,
Justice Powell for the majority noted that while the FTC must follow a least
restrictive alternative rule as to deceptive trademarks, "there is no First

Amendment rule, comparable to the limitation on § 5, [of the FTC Act] requiring a State to allow deceptive or misleading commercial speech whenever the publication of additional information can clarify or offset the
effects of the spurious communication." Id. at 895 n.1l. Justice Blackmun
specifically disagreed, noting that "[ciorrected falsehood, however, is
truth." Id. at 902. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether, in the false advertising context, the first amendment requires a least restrictive alternative
approach to commercial speech and trademarks.
9. See Statement by Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr., Director, Bureau of Competition, FTC, to the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws,
Oct. 17. 1978.
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of Northwestern University. 10 Professor Scherer's thesis is that
trademarks confer monopoly power which permits anti-competitive price premiums for products with a "well-received brand
image." Professor Scherer's recommendation is that "powerful
trademarks could be opened up to competitive licensing at the
stroke of a judicial pen." He briefly recognized the legal and economic problems involved, but concluded that "in numerous
cases the social benefits would outweigh the costs." One of the
benefits he listed was that under compulsory licensing, consumers would be deprived of the source identification function of a
trademark and would therefore have to spend additional time
and effort in determining product quality. To Professor Scherer
"it might add spice to life." To me, it is the height of intellectual
arrogance for government to deprive the busy working person of
the informational value of a trademark and tell that person that
they ought to spend more time investigating the "real" quality of
the things they buy and not rely upon the "irrational" drawing
power of a trademark. In Professor Scherer's balance sheet,
there is apparently no place to enter the time and effort saved
consumers by the informational value of trademarks and advertising. With more and more American households having two
working spouses in order to keep pace with inflation, Americans
have less and less time to spend agonizing over each of hundreds of purchasing decisions they make. And if consumers do
not want the information of advertising or the aura provided by
heavily advertised brand names, then some companies can
make a great deal of money by supplying only the physical product at a lower price. 1 But Professor Scherer would deprive the
consumer of that choice, because in his opinion, brand loyalty is
not a sensible kind of purchasing decision. Again, we are back
to the computer ideal of the consumer. Professor Scherer posits
that more low-income than high-income consumers pay a price
premium for "the dubious superiority of Wonder Bread over private-label alternatives." But this kind of apocryphal evidence
reveals an imagined intellectual superiority. For every low-income consumer that Professor Scherer can find that pays a few
cents more for Wonder bread than for "Jolly Markets" private
label bread, one can find a high-income consumer that pays a
$5,000.00 price premium for the so-called "imagined" superiority
of a Mercedes automobile. The point is that no busy working
person in our society has hours to spend agonizing over every
purchase at the supermarket or elsewhere. Everyone is too
10. Scherer, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 974, 997-1000 (1977) (The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff).
11. See BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 318 (1978).
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busy trying to earn the money to make a purchase in the first
place. And if in fact consumers begin to buy "Jolly Markets"
private label brand bread in droves and it eventually achieves a
dominant position in the market, will Professor Scherer and
Chairman Pertschuk then recommend that an antitrust action
be brought and Jolly Markets be forced to license its trademark
12
to the now-failing Wonder bread people?
The fallacy of this approach seems self-evident to me because it is based on an essentially undemocratic thesis: the consumer should not want what he or she wants. While I am not in
agreement with some of Professor Bork's theories of antitrust
law, I am in complete accord with his statement that "It] he contempt for advertising which is de rigueur in certain strata of our
society is based on invincible ignorance of the functions 3it
serves and the reasons it is presented to the public as it is.'

I cry "wolf' as to the FTC analysis of trademarks in the
ReaLemon case because I see the wolf attacking the strongest
and healthiest sheep. But now comes the good news I have for
the FTC: it is both legal and appropriate for it to seek cancellation of trademark registrations of terms which probably have become generic-that is, have become a "non-trademark." My
analogy may be strained, but here I see the wolf going after a
fellow wolf in sheep's clothing. I do not cry "wolf!" because I do
not think that generic non-trademarks should masquerade as
trademarks on the principal register. Removing the statutory
presumptions of validity for terms which the public uses to
name a genus of products is a proper and valuable function of
the FTC. It is pro-consumer and pro-democratic because it
merely presents to the Trademark Board the basic issue of
trademark law: do consumers in fact use this term to identify
and distinguish the goods of one seller or do they apply the term
to name the goods of all sellers of that product? No one is attempting to tell consumers what they should think or buy.
Rather, the FTC merely presents the issue: what in fact do consumers think?
Under section 14 of the Lanham Act, the FTC is empowered
to petition to cancel registrations on the principal register on
certain enumerated grounds. One of these grounds is if "the
registered mark becomes the common descriptive name" of an
12. The FTC's Economics Bureau has proposed a 'Theoretical and Em-

pirical Study of the Effectiveness of Patent and Trademark Licensing as Anitrust Remedies." P.T.C.J. (BNA) No. 416, A-2 (Feb. 15, 1979). T e BNA
opines that this may indicate either second thoughts or that the FTC is gird-

ing itself for future battles. Id.
13. Id. at 317.
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"article or substance."'1 4 The words "common descriptive name"
mean the same thing as "generic name. 15 A generic name is
the very antithesis of a trademark. 16 Whether a given term is
generic or a trademark is entirely in the hands of the consuming
public. Judge Leakned Hand in the Aspirin case put it succinctly. "The single question, as I view it, in all these cases, is
merely one of fact: What do buyers understand by the word for
17
whose use the parties are contending?"'
In some cases, a finding of genericness can be laid at the
door of a company which introduces a new product with no
other name for it but that term which the company considers to
be its trademark. 18 The Aspirin case is the classic example. In
other cases, the company uses the term in advertising in such a
way as to encourage consumers to name and ask for the product
by using the term the company thinks is its trademark. But the
test is not so much what the seller does as what the public
thinks. The real question is not so much what the seller's advertising input is but what is its impact on buyers. As Judge Augustus Hand remarked in the Cellophane case, "It therefore
makes no difference what efforts or money the DuPont company
expended in order to persuade the public that 'cellophane'
means an article of DuPont manufacture. So far as it did not
succeed in actually converting the world to its gospel it can have
no relief."' 19
On May 31, 1978, the FTC exercised its power under section
14 of the Lanham Act and petitioned to cancel the registration of
Formica on the ground it had become a generic name and was
no longer entitled to registration as a trademark. The registration in issue was for Formica, described as "laminated sheets of
wood, fabric or paper impregnated with synthetic resin and consolidated under heat and pressure, for use on table tops, furniture and wall panelling." This registration was originally issued
in 1946 under the Trademark Act of 1905, alleging use since 1928.
In 1947, four days after the Lanham Act became effective, regis14. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(4).
15. In re G.D. Searle & Co., 360 F.2d 650, 149 U.S.P.Q. 619 (C.C.P.A. 1966);

see Abercrombie &Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 189 U.S.P.Q.
759 (2d Cir. 1976).
16. See 1 McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:1 (1973).
The test of trademark or generic significance in a term turns on majority
usage. Id. at § 12:2(c).
17. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (D.N.Y. 1921).

18. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 39 U.S.P.Q.
296 (1938) ("Shredded Wheat"); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental
Surgeries Co., 196 U.S.P.Q. 121 (D. Or. 1976) ("Surgicenter").
19. Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 30 U.S.P.Q.
296 (2d Cir. 1936); see King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321
F.2d 577, 579, 138 U.S.P.Q. 349, 351 (2d Cir. 1963).
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trant Formica Corporation (a subsidiary of American Cyanamid
Co.) filed a section 12(c) affidavit claiming the benefits of the
Lanham Act. The registration was republished and in 1953 section 8 and 15 affidavits were filed to continue the registration and
obtain incontestability. The registration was renewed in 1966.
The registrant moved to dismiss the FTC's petition, claiming
that the FTC had the power to petition to cancel only registrations originally registered under the Lanham Act, not pre-Lanham Act registrations which were later republished under the
Lanham Act. Essentially, registrant argued that a 1905 Act registration which has been republished under the Lanham Act is
not a "mark registered on the principal register established by"
the Lanham Act. Both the FTC and the Formica Corporation
extensively briefed the issue, delving into the legislative history
of the relevant sections of the Act.
On November 8, 1978, the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board denied the registrant's motion to dismiss and upheld the
power of the FTC to petition to cancel a 1905 Act registration
that has been republished under the Lanham Act.20 One basis
for the decision was that a mark republished under the Lanham
Act enjoys all the benefits of the Act and therefore should be
subject to all of the same detriments. The -Board noted that
there is only one Principal Register. there should not be subclasses of registration on the Principal Register according to
when and how the mark came to be on the register. Thus, the
Board held that "[a] mark which is republished is thenceforth
as much on the Principal Register as though it had been originally registered thereon." Formica Corporation petitioned the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals for writs of mandamus
and prohibition to reverse the Board's decision. Early in 1979
21
the CCPA denied the writs.
Recently, articles have appeared in the press with titles
such as "Trademarks Under Fire, '22 in which trademark attorneys are quoted as including the Formica case as part of "an
unprecedented attack on trademarks." An editorial in the Wall
Street Journal lumped together both the ReaLemon and
Formica cases as constituting parts of the FTC's "name-robbing
campaign. '2 3 A similar theme was sounded by William Ball of
20. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Formica Corp., 200 U.S.P.Q. 182
(T.M.T.A.B. 1978).
21. Formica Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 590 F.2d 915, 200 U.S.P.Q. 641 (C.C.PA
1979); see P.T.C.J. (BNA) No. 414 (Feb. 1, 1979).
22. DuN's REVIEW, Sept. 1978 at 104.
23. Wall St. J., March 13, 1979, at 22, col. 1.
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New York in an article in the Trademark Reporter. 24 In my
opinion, one should not talk about the ReaLemon and Formica
cases in the same breath. I don't see how they have anything to
do with one another, unless one subscribes to the "religious
war" concept that nothing the FTC does can be proper. Even
Mr. Ball in his article conceded that:
It is highly unlikely that any support could be mustered among
trademark owners or practitioners for the proposition that a mark
which has truly become a generic term should nevertheless continue to be regarded as a valid trademark, with its25owner entitled to
maintain his rights to the exclusive use thereof.
The only coherent criticism I have heard of the FTC's exercise of its power to petition to cancel is that a challenge based on
genericness should be left to private litigation rather than government agency litigation. This is a legitimate point which requires analysis. First, I think the FTC properly carries out its
consumer protection and procompetitive function by presenting
for decision by the Trademark Board and the courts the question of genericness. Both business firms and attorneys and most
courts regard a registration as important and valuable property.26 A company which holds a trademark registration for
"semiconductor," or "diesel" or "wallpaper" has a false and unfair advantage in the marketplace. The registration and assertion of a generic term as a trademark deprives consumers and
competitors of the right to use the very name of the product, obviously distorting the informational value of advertising and
consumer purchasing decisions. The FTC has a proper interest
in removing such artificial roadblocks from the free marketplace
of commercial speech. Potential competitors or firms already in
the market are deprived of the right to tell customers the name
of the product, to the obvious detriment of free and open competition.
Secondly, why should government action be necessary?
Why not let private litigation weed out the generic names? Certainly the trademark bar has no moral compunctions about suing or defending a suit based on the claim of genericness. The
reason why registrations of probably generic terms continue to
grace the ifies of the Patent and Trademark Office is that no
competitor or potential competitor wants to undertake the tremendous expense of litigation over genericness. 27 To have
24. Ball, Government Versus Trademarks: Today-Pharmaceuticals,
ReaLemon and Formica-Tomorrow?,68 T.M. Rep. 471 (1978).
25. Id. at 491.
26. The CCPA noted the "respect in which businessmen hold certificates of Federal registration." De Walt, Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp., 289
F.2d 656, 129 U.S.P.Q. 275 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
27. In 1966 Formica Corp. opposed registration on NEW-MICA by
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standing to raise the issue, a firm might have to first invest in
advertising which used the term in a clear generic sense.2 8 A
healthy litigation fund had better be on hand for immediate use.
And why should I be a martyr for the cause? My lawyer tells me
it will take years and many thousands of dollars to litigate and
maybe we will win and maybe we will lose. Why should I bear
all the cost and grief while, if I win, my competitors and those
waiting in the wings get a free ride without the expense? This is
a variation of the economic theory of the "free ride." For example, no one fisherman will pay to build a lighthouse because
once built, every competitor will get a "free ride" by using the
lighthouse. 29 And in a society of humans, not angels, the
fishermen won't all agree to chip in and pay "equally" for the
lighthouse. So they turn to government to build the lighthouse
and require everyone to pay for it in taxes. That's what government is for: to do the things that need to be done for everyone's
benefit but for which no one person will pay the whole expense,
because no one person can charge for it. There is no way for one
fisherman to charge for the use of the lighthouse and no way for
one competitor to charge others for the expense of successfully
challenging the registration of a generic name. If one large
fishery cooperative decides it will pay to build a lighthouse on
its own, fine: there is no need for government action. If a company decides that it can justify to its stockholders the expense
of raising genericness in litigation, fine: that's one less thing for
the F IC to do. But to say that we obviously don't need any more
lighthouses because the privately constructed ones are all we
need and therefore government should stay away is not logical.
It is not logical to state that because no competitor has successfully challenged the registration of an arguably generic term,
therefore consumers do not use it as a generic term.
Our society has already made its policy choice because ConNewnan Corp. As a defensive gesture, Newnan counterclaimed to cancel a
"formica" registration on the ground of genericness. Newnan did not conduct a customer survey and relied upon evidence of "formica" usage (in
lower case letters) in advertisements by furniture retailers and fabricators
and the like. The Board held that Newnan had not carried its burden of
proof on the counterclaim. Formica Corp. v. Newnan Corp., 149 U.S.P.Q. 585
(T.M.T.A.B. 1966). While the Board held that NEW-MICA was not confusingly similar to "formica" the CCPA reversed on Formica Corporation's appeal and found likelihood of confusion. 396 F.2d 486, 158 U.S.P.Q. 104
(C.C.P.A. 1968).
28. A competitor probably has standing to petition to cancel on the
ground of genericness without actual use of the term if it proves it is engaged in the sale of goods of which the registered mark is allegedly generic.
See J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx Co., 280 F.2d 437, 126 U.S.P.Q. 362
(C.C.P.A. 1960).
29. The "lighthouse" example is discussed in P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
49 n.3, 160 (10th ed. 1976).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:151

gress almost 35 years ago in the Lanham Act gave the FTC the
statutory power to petition to cancel registrations on the ground
of genericness. To argue that the FTC should not exercise this
power is to argue that it should not use its statutory power, the
very basis for the ABA criticism ten years ago. Few persons seriously argue that we should disband the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice because private litigation should be
the only source of antitrust enforcement. This kind of "let private litigation do it all" argument runs directly counter to what
the vast majority of Americans have believed for 200 years is a
proper function of government: to prosecute civil and criminal
suits for the benefit of its citizens where one citizen cannot afford the costs of enforcing the law.
My comments as to the propriety of FTC generic cancellation actions are, and must be, qualified by the caveat that such
FTC petitions must be carefully and selectively chosen and
researched in advance. From my association as consultant to
the generic name program of the FTC, I can assure the Trademark Bar that such is the case. A great deal of research, preparation and study goes into a decision whether to file such a
petition. Many persons at all levels of the FTC must approve
before such a case is even fied. I will do all I can do to make my
voice heard to recommend a sensible, balanced and selective
use by the FTC of section 14 of the Lanham Act. This program is
merely a small part of the activities of the FTC and as Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon said, "I do not want to give you the impression... that we at the FTC are spending large quantities of
30
time hunting for trademarks to attack."
I serve as a consultant to the 'FTC in regard to its generic
name cancellation program because I want to contribute what I
can to an informed and balanced program of FTC use of its cancellation power. It does not serve the cause of trademarks and
the competitive system to have generic terms masquerade as
trademarks on the Principal Register. The FTC generic name
program is not an attack on trademarks: if it is an attack on anything, it is a challenge to generic names which pass themselves
off as trademarks. I urge the trademark bar to be selective in its
criticism of the FTC. Give it kudos when it is right and brickbats
when it is wrong.
30. Dixon, Trademarks,the F.TC.and the Lanham Act, 68 T.M. Rep. 463,
469 (1978).
Additional Reading.
W.J. LIEBELER, SHOULD THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION's ACTIVITIES BE

STRENGTHENED AND ENLARGED? IN THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA

(1978 McGraw-Hill).
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